Club efficiency and Lindahl equilibrium with semipublic goods. by Raa, T. ten & Gilles, R.P.
Lindahl Equilibrium and Schweizer’s Open
Club Model with Semi-Public Goods∗
Thijs ten Raa† Robert P. Gilles‡
June 2003
First revision: March 2004
Second revision: November 2004
Abstract
In this paper we extend Schweizer’s open club model to clubs with goods that have a
semi-public nature rather than a pure public nature. We study limit core allocations,
which are those allocations that remain in the core of a replicated economy. An equiv-
alent notion for open clubs with pure public goods was Schweizer’s concept of club
eﬃciency under a variable number of economic agents. We show that given certain
conditions the equivalence of limit core allocations and Lindahl equilibria holds for a
wide range of open club economies with semi-public club goods. We also show that
extension to a more general class of open club economies seems implausible.
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It is well known that the classical Debreu-Scarf convergence of the core and the set of
competitive equilibria in a replicated economy with private goods does not extend well to
economies with public goods under the standard concept of blocking. Indeed, the well
known counterexamples to the Edgeworth conjecture demonstrate that, in the absence of
crowding, the per capita cost of supplying a given vector of public goods decreases with
the number of agents, thus rendering small coalitions relatively impotent. There are, in
principle, two basic methods to overcome this diﬃculty. One consists in switching to
alternative equilibrium concepts, thus ”blowing up” the set of equilibria in order to match
the larger set of core allocations (Mas-Colell, 1980). The other reduces the set of core
allocations by allowing for ”congestion eﬀects” (Roberts, 1974, and Vasil’ev et al., 1995).
This paper belongs to the latter category.
Lindahl equilibrium is a well-known solution concept in the general equilibrium theory
of public goods, but its competitive basis is shaky because of the mismatch with the core.
In this paper we show that if the public goods are not pure but feature some form of rivalry
in terms of opportunity costs, Lindahl pricing within a club with a variable membership
base has a ﬁrm competitive basis.
We do so in the context of Schweizer’s (1983) model of an open club economy. This
model assumes that the club has a variable membership base, drawn from an unlimited
pool of potential members. The issue of how to partition a given (closed) population of
agents in a number of clubs is not addressed. The possible variation of the numbers of
consumers amounts to replication of the economy and an allocation is now called club
eﬃcient if it cannot be improved upon under varying membership bases. To explain the
concept further, a membership proﬁle with private and club good consumption plans (for
each type of agents) is feasible if the consumption plans can be provided with the initial
endowment of the club members and it is club eﬃcient if no other feasible membership
proﬁle yields higher utility to all members. Schweizer (1983) showed that a club eﬃcient
allocation must be a competitive, Walrasian equilibrium for an economy with public and
private goods and that agents whose numbers are variable do not and should not pay for the
public good. His results consolidate the limit core theorem and the Henry George theorem,
respectively.1
One of the problems of the original formulation of Schweizer (1983) is that the use of
1It can be shown that club eﬃciency is equivalent to the Debreu-Scarf limit core property, at least for
economies with purely private goods. An indirect proof can be based on noting that Schweizer (1983) showed
equivalence of the Walrasian equilibrium concept and club eﬃciency. Debreu and Scarf (1963) showed
equivalence of Walrasian equilibria and the limit core. Hence, club eﬃciency, the Walrasian equilibrium
concept, and the limit core property are the same.
1a pure public good is unrealistic due to the non-crowding hypothesis. In this paper we try
to remedy this particular problem and introduce intermediate types of goods, denoted as
“club goods.” These club goods can be purely private or purely public or semi-public. We
investigate when a club eﬃcient allocation is a Lindahl equilibrium.
In our formulation crowding does not enter the utility functions directly. The utility
of an agent depends exclusively on his or her own consumption of private goods and club
goods. The degree of “publicness” of the club goods is determined by the costs of pro-
duction. A cost function expresses the input requirements of a membership proﬁle (the
composition of a club by type of agents) for each level of club goods consumption (possi-
bly varying by type of agents). In the polar cases of private and pure public goods, the cost
function is linear and constant, respectively.
The main contribution of this paper is the delineation of cost functions of club goods
such that a club eﬃcient allocation is a Lindahl equilibrium. One may expect to encounter
the membership proﬁle of such a club eﬃcient allocation in an economy with a continuum
of agents, not plagued by integer problems. More interesting, the prices supporting a club
eﬃcient allocation are Lindahl prices.
The public goods literature incorporates a tricky division as regards the exogeneity or
endogeneity of the number of consumers and the level of the public goods. In the older
literature, going back to Foley (1970), the number of consumers is ﬁxed and the level of
the public goods is variable. However, the public goods are neither pure nor ﬁxed, but de-
termined by preferences. Foley deﬁned a Lindahl equilibrium as a set of prices, economy-
wide for private goods and individualized for public goods, such that markets clear. He
proceeded to demonstrate that Lindahl equilibria are in the core. Ellickson (1973) showed
that a Lindahl equilibrium need no longer be in the core when public goods are not pure,
but have opportunity costs that increase with the number of consumers; he also showed
that the core may even be empty. Convexity (in particular of technology) plays no role
in the proof that a Lindahl equilibrium allocation is in the core when crowding is present,
but does play a role in showing that any core allocation is a Lindahl equilibrium allocation
and in showing that the set of core or Lindahl equilibrium allocations is nonempty when
crowding is present. We follow Ellickson in admitting non-pure public goods, but assume
some convexity at the aggregate level of technology to keep scope for positive results.
Milleron (1972) considered a replicated economy with pure public goods. The trou-
ble with pure public goods is that they are not replicated along with the population in the
economy and their per capita opportunity costs vanish. To keep the Lindahl equilibria in
the core, Milleron changed the preferences or endowments of the consumers as the econ-
omy becomes large. Even then the core does not shrink to the set of Lindahl equilibria.
2Vasil’ev, Weber, and Wiesmeth (1995) were able to let the core shrink to the set of Lindahl
equilibria, but also had to change the consumers’ utility functions as they were replicated.
Conley (1994) obtained this result assuming that consumers are either asymptotically sa-
tiated or strictly nonsatiated in public goods; these are extreme polar cases of consumer
utility functions. We need no such assumptions in the context of the open club model with
semi-public club goods.
The roles of consumer numbers and public good levels were reversed in Schweizer
(1983). He solved for allocations that included a club membership proﬁle. On the other
hand, he ﬁxed the level of the public goods and devised “Lindahlian” price support of
club eﬃcient allocations, but had to assume that some types of agents are given in ﬁxed
numbers. The other types escape taxation as they can bring in more members of their types
and, thus, may spread the burden of their collective contribution to the public good. We
follow Schweizer in letting the numbers of consumers be variable, but the public goods
are neither pure nor ﬁxed. At least in principle the use of the open club model may drive
the main result, that Lindahl equilibria exhaust the core, simply by increasing the set of
Lindahl equilibria, but we do not believe so. The Lindahl equilibria we analyze feature not
only utility maximizing agents, but also proﬁt maximizing club administrators. Members
pay their marginal cost. Hence there are pricing rules for all club goods. The multiplicity
of equilibria is no larger than in the Arrow-Debreu model. The main use of the open
membership base is that the analysis is not plagued by the integer problem.
We look at the provision of club goods that in principle have a semi-public nature. It
is assumed that these commodities are provided through the club, and therefore are princi-
pally locally collective. But their rivalry properties might be diﬀerent from that of a purely
local public good. We model this by means of a cost function that associates input re-
quirements with members’ demands for these club goods. Our main theorem states that
for certain club goods with a semi-public nature the notions of club eﬃciency and Lindahl
equilibrium remain equivalent. For this we extend Schweizer’s (1983) equivalence theo-
rem (of Walrasian equilibrium and club eﬃciency) to a model in which the aggregation
function for the club goods has a certain speciﬁcation and certain properties. We also show
that it cannot be expected that our Lindahl equivalence result can be extended further to
more general speciﬁcations of the aggregation function.
The second section develops the model, Section 3 states and proves our equivalence
result, and Section 4 concludes the paper with a discussion of the result, its relationship to
the literature, and its implications.
32 Clubs and semi-public club goods
In this section we introduce a model of an open club economy consisting of a membership
base, an allocation of private goods consumed, and an allocation of so-called club goods,
which are provided collectively. The membership base as part of our model of a club
represents the “openness” of the club. In our theory we use a club as a replication device.
We consider an economy with a ﬁnite set of consumer types denoted by t = 1,...,T. A
vectorn ∈ RT
+ representsaproﬁleofacoalitionofeconomicagents, comprisingnt members
of type t. A proﬁle n ∈ RT
+ forms the membership base of the club economy. Throughout
we assume that agents of the same type are treated equally, i.e., agents of the same type
consume the same quantities of private as well as club goods. This assumption enables us
to discuss replication properly.2
We consider a situation with ` ∈ N private goods. Agents of type t are endowed with a
commodity bundle wt ∈ R`
+. It is assumed that wt > 0 for all t.3 Private consumption of an
agent of type t is now given by xt + wt ∈ R` where xt denotes the net consumption of type




R`T. Total net consumption of private goods in a club with membership base n ∈ RT
+ is




There are m ∈ N club goods. Each club good is provided collectively by the club
to its members. Again assuming equal treatment, an agent of type t now consumes the
club goods at levels given by a vector yt ∈ Rm
+. The consumption plan for club goods is




+ . Total consumption of club goods in a
club with membership base n ∈ RT





premise of this paper is that the total consumption of club goods (by type) determines cost.
Cost must be a function of the product of population and the bundle consumed by each
type. This functional form speciﬁcation paves the way for the competitive foundation of
Lindahl prices. This is formalized as follows.
Modelling hypothesis
The production technology is represented by the induced cost functionC:RmT
+ → R`
+ which
for every membership base n ∈ RT
+ and consumption plan y ∈ RmT
+ assigns to the total




+ a bundle of private goods C (y) ∈ R`
+ that
is used to create the club goods at these levels.4
The modelling hypothesis equates the marginal cost of a member with the marginal cost
2In the standard model of a replicated pure exchange economy, the equal treatment property can be shown
to hold if preferences are strictly convex (Debreu and Scarf, 1963).
3Here we deﬁne wt > 0 if wt = 0 and wt , 0.
4We may allow substitution of inputs by generalizing C to a correspondence.
4of his or her club bundle. Hence entry fees or subsidies depend only on the consumption
bundle of a particular type. This is the quintessence of Lindahl prices and explains why
they can support a club eﬃcient allocation.
This framework, however, encompasses a number of interesting cases. The club goods
have a purely private nature if C (y) = e C
³PT
t=1 ntyt´
, where the cost function e C : Rm
+ → R`
+
represents a standard private goods production technology converting the ` private good
inputs into m private good outputs. (This reduces the model to the standard setting of a
pure exchange economy.)
Second, the club goods have a purely public nature in the sense of Schweizer (1983) if
C (y) = Z ∈ R`
+ for every y ∈ RmT
+ , where Z is some ﬁxed input vector.
Finally, there are many intermediate possibilities, giving the club goods a semi-public
nature. For example, if C(y) = e C(maxt=1,...,T ntyt), where the max operator on Rm is deﬁned
by maxi(y1,y2) = max(y1
i,y2
i), i = 1,...,m, and, as before, e C : Rm
+ → R`
+ represents a
standard private goods production technology, we can interpret the club goods to be based
on a ﬁxed infrastructure such as a network. The capacity of the network has to handle the
peak demands, which in turn determines the construction costs. A contemporary example
of such a situation is that of the provision of access to Internet through a so-called “Internet
Service Provider” (ISP). One can interpret an ISP as a club that provides access to Internet
services to their members. The cost function e C introduced here exactly represents the cost
structure for such an ISP. Capacity of the ISP’s server needs to be based on peak demands
for Internet access at the diﬀerent time moments during a standard period of time. These
time moments can be represented by the discrete parameter t.
These examples feature an important commonality, namely convexity. In the purely
public case in the sense of Schweizer, the induced cost function C is constant, which is
obviously convex. In the purely private and semi-public cases, C is induced by a private
goods cost function e C. If e C is convex, as is standard in neoclassical production theory
(excluding increasing returns to scale in production), then so is C in either case, as the
latter is the composition of e C and either summation (of private goods) or maximization (of
semi-public goods).
A club is now introduced as a tuple
¡
nt, xt,yt¢













is a club good consumption plan. A club
¡
nt, xt,yt¢













Net demands for the private goods and the costs for the provision of the club goods sum to
5zero at most.5 For simplicity, there is no production of private goods. Its inclusion would
be a straightforward extension of the model.
A consumer of type t has an extended utility function Ut : R` × Rm → R over his total
private and club good consumption. However, since his initial endowment wt is ﬁxed, we
may simply write Ut(xt,yt). In principle we allow an agent to have short positions in all
commodities.
Next we introduce our main eﬃciency concept. Consider two feasible clubs given by
(nt, xt,yt)t=1,...,T and (nt
0, xt
0,yt













0) for every t with n
t > 0.







0)t=1,...,T is called club eﬃcient.
A feasible club (nt
0, xt
0,yt
0)t=,...,T is a Lindahl equilibrium if there exist a private goods
price vector p ∈ R`
+ and personalized admission price vectors p1,..., pT ∈ Rm
+ such that
the following conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) For every t ∈ {1,...,T} with nt
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(ii) The club (nt
0, xt
0,yt





















(iii) The club (nt
0, xt
0,yt















By the ﬁrst condition, consumers maximize their utility given the market prices for the
private goods and the personal admission prices for the semi-public club goods. The fees
collected cover the costs of the provision of the club goods by the second condition. The
5We remark that Schweizer (1983) introduces a given endowment for the club, denoted by F = 0, that
covers the provision costs of the public goods and the net demands for private goods. In that case, in equation
(1) the zero is replaced by F. Here we limit our discussion to the case without such an endowment.
6third condition stipulates that a public administration is in charge of the provision of the
club goods and admission prices, and as such has the objective to maximize its “proﬁts.”
(This maximal proﬁt is zero by the second condition.) This condition is not included here
because we consider the number of consumers to be exogenous. (See Foley, 1970, and
other papers referenced in Section 1.) However, since our theorem will entail that club
eﬃciency implies Lindahl pricing, the result is only strengthened by the inclusion of the
third condition in the deﬁnition of Lindahl equilibrium.
3 A decentralization result
Relatively little is assumed to arrive at complete decentralization of eﬃcient clubs through
appropriate price systems. Following Foley (1970) and Schweizer (1983), positivity of
prices is ensured to render a complete decentralization through Lindahl pricing.
Axiom.
(a) For every type t = 1,...,T the utility function Ut is assumed to be continuous, quasi-
concave, and strongly monotonic.




In the context of this assumption we have the following result.




with a strictly positive endowment,
P
t=1 nt
0wt À 0, can be supported as a Lindahl equilib-
rium with strictly positive prices.




























In this deﬁnition we let yt be at location 1 + t.
Now for any proﬁle n ∈ RT
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6See footnote 3 for the vector inequality notation.
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We remark that also D ⊂ R`+mT.
Bt is convex by quasi-concavity of Ut for every type t. It follows that Bn is convex for
each n. Because λBn + (1 − λ)Bb n = Bλn+(1−λ)b n for λ ∈ [0,1], it follows that the set B is
convex. Furthermore, from continuity of Ut for every type t the set B is open in R` × RmT
+ .
We show that D is convex. Let (y1,...,yT,z,n) and (b y1,...,b yT,b z,b n) constitute (but
not be) members of D. Deﬁne v =
³
n1y1,...,nTyT´
and b v =
³
b n1b y1,...,b nTb yT´
. Then









Now consider λ ∈ [0,1]. We have to show that there exists a tuple (˜ y1,..., ˜ yT, ˜ z, ˜ n) such
that (−C (˜ v) − ˜ z, ˜ v) ∈ D where ˜ v =
³
˜ n1˜ y1,..., ˜ nT˜ yT´
, ˜ v = λv + (1 − λ)b v, and C (˜ v) + ˜ z =








. This can be accomplished by selecting ˜ yt = λntyt +
(1 − λ)b ntb yt for every t,e nt = 1, and




−C (˜ v) + λz + (1 − λ)b z.
Now ˜ v = λv + (1 − λ)b v and by convexity of the cost function C it follows that




−C (˜ v) + λz + (1 − λ)b z
= C
¡
λv + (1 − λ)b v
¢
−C (˜ v) + λz + (1 − λ)b z
= λz + (1 − λ)b z.
Hence, ˜ z = 0 and thus indeed (−C (˜ v) − ˜ z, ˜ v) ∈ D, ﬁnishing the proof that D is convex.
We deﬁne the cone generated by the feasible set D by
D = {λd |d ∈ D and λ = 0}.
By convexity of D it follows that D is a convex cone.




constitutes a member of B,
¡
b nt,b yt¢
t=1,...,T andb z ∈ R`
+ constitute a member of D, and λ = 0
such that




































































t=1,...,T. Since this contradicts the eﬃciency hypothesis, it follows that λ = 0
and the only conceivable intersection point of B and D is the origin. However, since B
is open in R` × RmT
+ , a perturbation of the origin to the left, with the ﬁrst (`-dimensional)
component slightly negative, would still belong to B. By construction of D and D, the
perturbation would also belong to D, contradicting that the origin is the only conceivable
intersection point. Hence the intersection is empty.
By the separating hyperplane theorem and the fact that D is a cone, there exist p ∈ R`
+
and p1,..., pT ∈ Rm
+ not all equal to zero such that
(p, p
1,..., p
T)B = 0 = (p, p
1,..., p
T)D. (2)
By strong monotonicity of Ut it can be concluded that B is comprehensive, and therefore
(p, p1,..., pT) > 0. It must value (−C (v),v) ∈ D nonpositively: (p1,..., pT)v 5 pC(v) for
all v = 0. Since p = 0 would imply (p, p1,..., pT) = 0, we must have p > 0. Also, by
assumption that the aggregated total endowment is strictly positive, we may conclude that
P
nt
0pwt > 0. Thus, there is a type t with nt
0 > 0 and pwt > 0. For this type t an interior
consumption plan is feasible with respect to pxt + ptyt 5 0. Hence, by strong monotonicity
and continuity of Ut, using a standard argument, p À 0 as well as pt À 0. Hence, by
nonzero endowment assumption, pwt > 0 for all t. By the same argument, all pt À 0. We
will now prove that these prices constitute a Lindahl equilibrium.
First, we show the consumer’s utility maximization condition. Suppose that the tu-
ple given by (xt,0,...,0,yt,0,...,0) — with yt at location 1 + t — satisﬁes Ut(xt,yt) >
Ut(xt
0,yt
0). In fact, since p À 0, pwt > 0, and the utility function is strongly monotonic and
continuous, the same holds for a pair of slightly smaller vectors. Now from the separation
property (2) and the strict positivity of all prices it is concluded that pxt + ptyt > 0.
It remains to show that (xt
0,yt
0) satisﬁes the budget condition pxt
0 + ptyt
0 = 0 if nt
0 > 0.

























































































belongs to the boundary of Bt ⊂ B. From
(2) it immediately follows that pxt
0 + ptyt
0 = 0. Hence, each term in (3) must be zero. Since
nt
0 = 0 for all types t it now immediately can be concluded that pxt
0 + ptyt
0 = 0 if nt
0 > 0.
9Together with previously shown statement, this proves that (xt
0,yt
0) indeed solves the
consumer’s problem if nt
0 > 0.
Second, we consider the ﬁnancial balance condition. Since, as shown above, each term




























where the last equality reﬂects the fact that the feasibility constraint is binding, using strong
monotonicity.
Finally, we consider the problem of the public administration. Since the prices value D














This proves that (y1
0,...,yT
0,n0) indeed solves the public administration’s problem.
This completes the proof of the theorem. ¥
The converse of the theorem also holds. The proof is an easy adaptation of Schweizer’s
(1983) proof of his second theorem. Thus, we have a true equivalence result.
The implementation of more general club good cost functions is probably very hard,
if not impossible. In the next example we consider a cost function that is more general,
but fails to lead to equivalence of the set of eﬃcient clubs and the set of Lindahl equi-
libria. Semi-public goods, as we deﬁned them, have a distinct structure in that only total
consumption by type, y = (n1y1,...,nTyT) ∈ RmT
+ , aﬀects their provision. In general, a club
with proﬁle n and club goods demands y may impose resource requirements in a way that
is not separable by type.
Counterexample. Consider an economy setting with one private and one club good, i.e.,
` = m = 1, and two types of consumers, i.e., T = 2, with the following utility functions:
U
1 (x,y) = min(2x + 4,y);
U
2 (x,y) = min(2x + 3,2y).
Now consider a production structure for the club good that does not satisfy the functional















This cost function can be interpreted as representing a semi-public good of which the pro-
vision is based on the maximal consumption capacity requested, where the maximal ca-
pacity is maxnt. This cost function is convex, but here costs are not a function of the total
10consumption of club goods by type, n1y1,...,nTyT. The trade-oﬀ within types between
members and mean consumption does not hold. Total consumption of the club goods by
type is shown to be an insuﬃcient statistic for core equivalence.
Consider the club given by n0 = (1,1), x1
0 = x2
0 = −1, and y1
0 = y2
0 = 2. This club is
eﬃcient, as we demonstrate ﬁrst.
We show that U2 cannot be lifted over its club level, 1, whenever n2 > 0, U1 = 2, and fea-




















Hence, U2(x2,y2) 5 1, proving club eﬃciency.










Now suppose that there is a Lindahl price p. Substituting the Lindahl break-even constraint
for the semi-public goods, the sum of the consumers’ budgets is zero. Since each of these
budgets is nonpositive, they are all zero. Better clubs must be priced higher, hence posi-
tively. But this is not so. Indeed, consider any club with n arbitrary and (x1,y1) = (−1,2).
Now (x2,y2) = (−1/2,1) and, therefore, a consumer of type 2 prefers this club to the orig-
inal one. This consumption bundle is half of the club-eﬃcient bundle, (x2
0,y2
0) = (−1,2),
which has zero value. This implies that it is aﬀordable. This in turn implies that the eﬃcient
club cannot be supported as a Lindahl equilibrium. ¥
4 Discussion
Our theorem provides price support to club allocations that cannot be improved upon.
These prices are linear, unlike Mas-Colell’s (1980) personalized price schedules — ex-
tended to economies with multiple private goods by Diamantaras and Gilles (1996) and to
club economies by Gilles and Scotchmer (1997) — or the admission fees or “wages” used
by Barham and Wooders (1998). The theorem and its proof are adaptations of Schweizer’s
(1983) theorem on club eﬃcient allocations. He obtains the Henry George Theorem for
11economies with ﬁxed public goods and associated inputs and, if the latter are zero, the
welfare and core limit theorems. In the present paper, club goods are not exogenous, but
endogenous, namely the outcome of competition among utility maximizers. Moreover, in
principle these club goods are not purely public, but semi-public.
It is well known that there is no competitive basis for Lindahl equilibria in pure pub-
lic goods economies (Milleron, 1972, and Bewley, 1981). Wooders (1978) has conjec-
tured that the core shrinks when there is crowding, but Conley and Wooders (1997) show
that the second welfare theorem is generally false. Barham and Wooders (1998) provide
useful relationships between optima and competitive equilibria, but all these papers con-
cern economies with only one private and one public good. In these papers, the private
good required to provide n members with y units of the public good is given by C(n,y)
and utility features a congestion argument represented by U(x,y,n). Now the reduced
form is given by U(x − C(n,y)/n,y,n). Wooders (1978, page 336) assumes that the best
value with respect to y is maximized further for two consecutive integer values of n. In
other words, the expression (maximized with respect to y) is assumed locally constant
in n. This constitutes a knife-edge, joint assumption on C and U. Now in this paper
we have essentially absorbed the (utility) congestion argument in the costs. Denoting
the resulting cost and utility functions by e C and e U, respectively, the relation becomes
U(x − C(n,y)/n,y,n) = e U(x − e C(n,y)/n,y). By the envelop theorem, the maximum with
respect to y is locally constant with respect to n if e C(n,y)/n) is locally constant with respect
to n. This implies e C(n,y) = n·c(y). Our modelling hypothesis, however, is e C(n,y) = C(ny).
Wooders’andourapproachesareconsistentifthepercapitacostfunctionc(whichincludes
the congestion costs) features constant returns to scale.
For economies with multiple private and public goods, Conley (1994) conjectures that
the core of a public goods economy converges only in the knife-edge case in which the
increasing returns to coalitional size are precisely oﬀset by crowding, diminishing marginal
returns in production, or something similar. In a sense, we have articulated this intuition.
For example, if the public goods function is C(ny) = F + (ny)2 (everything scalar), then
club eﬃciency brings about the eﬃcient scale of production, n0y0 =
√
F, an argument that
extends to more general production possibilities.
An alternative model of an economy with multiple public goods such that the Lin-
dahl equilibrium emerges, has been undertaken by Vasil’ev, Weber, and Wiesmeth (1995).
That paper uses an alternative core concept based on utility levels of members of blocking
coalitions depending on the replica size and the coalition structure. The comparison is as
with Wooders and co-authors, without the congestion argument in the costs and with nT-
dimensional (the number of types). For one type the reduced form reads U(x−C(y)/n,y,n)
12and we may absorb the (third) congestion argument in the costs. Although our approach
to club goods may seem diﬀerent, the two approaches are closely related, in the sense that
the opportunity cost of individual public — or club — goods consumption is not reduced
with the size of the economy in either model. From this perspective the contribution of our
paper is a demonstration that Schweizer’s theorem encompasses the core limit theorem of
Vasil’ev, Weber, and Wiesmeth (1995).
The just mentioned replication literature has attempted to provide a competitive basis
for Lindahl equilibria by modelling congestion on the demand side, while we have put
congestion on the supply side. In a way this is a return to the intuition of Ellickson (1973,
p. 417): what matters is the convexity of the aggregate technology set. When the number
of consumers varies freely, the convexity ensures that any core allocation is a Lindahl
equilibrium, provided that cost is a function of the product of the subpopulation of each
type and the club bundle they consume. Then Lindahl prices also represent the marginal
eﬀect of adding another person of a given type to the club. This explains when and why
Lindahl equilibria have a competitive basis in economies with semi-public goods.
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